Best analysis of Hamas win
A fascinating interview of Matti Steinberg, former advisor on Palestinian affairs to the Shin Bet was published in the Friday Haaretz 'Weeksend' (linked below).
The article indicates that Dr Steinberg never stopped warning cabinet ministers and army generals about the impending Hamas win. Since the eruption of the intifada, he tried to persuade the decision-makers and the army chiefs that if they turned their backs on the pragmatic camp in the territories, Hamas would be strengthened and come to power. The article goes on to says that since Ariel Sharon conceived the unilateral withdrawal plan, Steinberg swam against the major current that brainwashed the Israeli public on both the right and the left. Dr Steinberg quotes "I am furious at the senior levels, who did not do what was obligatory," he says. "They are behaving like a cat that is dazzled by the headlights of the car that is about to run him over and remains nailed to the spot."
Steinberg goes onto say that "indeed, the blame is divided between us and the Palestinian Authority [PA], but since we are the strong side, the brunt of the burden falls on us. The constantly surfacing corruption in the PA is a major issue when the public loses hope about political progress, when it [stops hoping for] economic and social improvement. A political horizon is the only thing that can neutralize criticism about the corruption. In periods when negotiations were held with Israel, the Palestinian public supported the PA and Fatah. They were not known for their incorruptibility then, either. The Palestinians understand that Hamas did not sully its hands for the simple reason that it did not have the opportunity: it was not in power. The defects of Fatah and the PA stand out when there are no political achievements."
As to future, Dr Steinberg indicates that "Hamas will not forgo [its goals] but will suspend the resistance [the violent struggle]. It will mothball its weapons, not hand them over. The resistance is a means which is sometimes utilized and sometimes shelved until the right time. The main danger does not lie in Hamas' military threat, but on the political plane, in the empowerment process, what they call tamkim, through which Islam rises to power in the Arab world. Before our eyes, a state of the Muslim Brotherhood is taking on flesh and bone ... for the first time in history, we are witnessing a transition from a conflict which is innately political-national, in which the territorial dimension is of great import, to a religious conflict whose territorial dimension is derived from the theological campaign".
As for final status negotiations with Hamas he notes that "their room for maneuverability is extremely limited. A permanent settlement is forbidden at any time and under any conditions by the Muslims, because its implication is to legitimize the plundering of Islamic lands and a total forgoing of jihad as a means to restore them. This category includes agreements to end the conflict of the kind Fatah espouses, such as the Clinton blueprint or the Geneva Initiative. In the eyes of Hamas, that is like delegitimizing Islam itself. Hamas, like the Muslim Brotherhood in general, is ready for a compromise along the lines of a hudna (cease-fire). That is a temporary settlement, like the Khudaybiya agreement in which the prophet Mohammed declared a cease-fire with the Quraysh tribe for 10 years. It can be extended for 10 years, provided this is to the benefit of the Muslims ... they are sticklers when it comes to the return of the refugees to their homes. They are not ready for any compromise in Jerusalem and they insist on the dismantlement of all the settlements and do not want to hear about settlement blocs".
As to what Acting Prime Minister Olmert should do today he says"I would stop declaring and hinting at unilateral measures. I would invite Abu Mazen in order to create the political tie that will connect his supreme powers with broad public support. Already today, before Abu Mazen starts to think about resigning, we must present to him a permanent agreement on the basis of the Clinton blueprint and discard the road map, which is a recipe for deadlock. It is important to do this so that Fatah will not be tempted into forming a unity government with Hamas, as that will mean total surrender and the erasure of the separation between two worldviews. I would give him a few assets to show that pragmatism pays. If we do that, there is a chance that Hamas will become captive to Palestinian public opinion. Its hard core is no more than 15 to 20 percent. Two-thirds of those who voted Hamas do not support its theological worldview. They went to Hamas because of their disappointment in the failure of the political path. They are a reversible mass." Link
The article indicates that Dr Steinberg never stopped warning cabinet ministers and army generals about the impending Hamas win. Since the eruption of the intifada, he tried to persuade the decision-makers and the army chiefs that if they turned their backs on the pragmatic camp in the territories, Hamas would be strengthened and come to power. The article goes on to says that since Ariel Sharon conceived the unilateral withdrawal plan, Steinberg swam against the major current that brainwashed the Israeli public on both the right and the left. Dr Steinberg quotes "I am furious at the senior levels, who did not do what was obligatory," he says. "They are behaving like a cat that is dazzled by the headlights of the car that is about to run him over and remains nailed to the spot."
Steinberg goes onto say that "indeed, the blame is divided between us and the Palestinian Authority [PA], but since we are the strong side, the brunt of the burden falls on us. The constantly surfacing corruption in the PA is a major issue when the public loses hope about political progress, when it [stops hoping for] economic and social improvement. A political horizon is the only thing that can neutralize criticism about the corruption. In periods when negotiations were held with Israel, the Palestinian public supported the PA and Fatah. They were not known for their incorruptibility then, either. The Palestinians understand that Hamas did not sully its hands for the simple reason that it did not have the opportunity: it was not in power. The defects of Fatah and the PA stand out when there are no political achievements."
As to future, Dr Steinberg indicates that "Hamas will not forgo [its goals] but will suspend the resistance [the violent struggle]. It will mothball its weapons, not hand them over. The resistance is a means which is sometimes utilized and sometimes shelved until the right time. The main danger does not lie in Hamas' military threat, but on the political plane, in the empowerment process, what they call tamkim, through which Islam rises to power in the Arab world. Before our eyes, a state of the Muslim Brotherhood is taking on flesh and bone ... for the first time in history, we are witnessing a transition from a conflict which is innately political-national, in which the territorial dimension is of great import, to a religious conflict whose territorial dimension is derived from the theological campaign".
As for final status negotiations with Hamas he notes that "their room for maneuverability is extremely limited. A permanent settlement is forbidden at any time and under any conditions by the Muslims, because its implication is to legitimize the plundering of Islamic lands and a total forgoing of jihad as a means to restore them. This category includes agreements to end the conflict of the kind Fatah espouses, such as the Clinton blueprint or the Geneva Initiative. In the eyes of Hamas, that is like delegitimizing Islam itself. Hamas, like the Muslim Brotherhood in general, is ready for a compromise along the lines of a hudna (cease-fire). That is a temporary settlement, like the Khudaybiya agreement in which the prophet Mohammed declared a cease-fire with the Quraysh tribe for 10 years. It can be extended for 10 years, provided this is to the benefit of the Muslims ... they are sticklers when it comes to the return of the refugees to their homes. They are not ready for any compromise in Jerusalem and they insist on the dismantlement of all the settlements and do not want to hear about settlement blocs".
As to what Acting Prime Minister Olmert should do today he says"I would stop declaring and hinting at unilateral measures. I would invite Abu Mazen in order to create the political tie that will connect his supreme powers with broad public support. Already today, before Abu Mazen starts to think about resigning, we must present to him a permanent agreement on the basis of the Clinton blueprint and discard the road map, which is a recipe for deadlock. It is important to do this so that Fatah will not be tempted into forming a unity government with Hamas, as that will mean total surrender and the erasure of the separation between two worldviews. I would give him a few assets to show that pragmatism pays. If we do that, there is a chance that Hamas will become captive to Palestinian public opinion. Its hard core is no more than 15 to 20 percent. Two-thirds of those who voted Hamas do not support its theological worldview. They went to Hamas because of their disappointment in the failure of the political path. They are a reversible mass." Link
posted by SJ at 8:23 PM
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