More analysis on Hamas win
I have linked Shaul Arieli's article in today's Ynet. Shaul Arieli is a former brigadier general in the IDF and was advisor to Ehud Barak during the period from around Camp David in July 2000 to January 2001. He more recently was a signature to the Geneva accords. Arieli is considered a leading expert in maps and for example is regarded as an expert in the intricacies associated with the route of the separation fence separating Israel from the West Bank. His opinion should be listened to carefully.
Arieli first notes that there are two main refrains that have been heard since the Hamas win: That a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority cannot be considered a partner, and the second says that because of this, Israel must continue to make unilateral disengagements. He suggests, however, that those making the first claim must ask themselves honestly: Did they consider the PA under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas and Ahmed Qurei was a credible partner? If so, why have they stubbornly refused all efforts to renew negotiations with them over the last five years? And if not, why should Israel get so excited that there is no negotiating partner? According to that approach, not much has changed, and the policy of unilateralism based on this logic should remain the preferred one.
The truth as Arieli notes is that there is a substantial difference between Fatah and Hamas. He notes that Hamas is unprepared, in contrast to the PLO, to recognize the principle of two states for two peoples, because "All of Palestine, from the river to the sea, is Islamic holy land." Hamas unlike Fatah even if they were to recognise a two state solution would not consider land swaps, dividing East Jerusalem or a demalitarized Palestinian state (as the Palestinian delegation at Geneva accepted) let alone Israeli sovereignty over "united Jerusalem, the Jordan valley and settlement blocs". Hamas in any event does not believe that the right of return should take into account "demograhic concerns" as Fatah have at times indicated.
In short, Hamas is no partner to any serious diplomatic negotiations. Arieli notes that Israel must not fantasize about turning Hamas into a possible partner for a final status agreement because of its religious outlook. In addition, it must reject any process by which the Palestinian leadership goes back to developing an illusion of power and refusal to compromise as a preferred method to establish a state and to solve the refugee issue. Using Gaza-style withdrawals, the Sharon government did all it could to avoid renewing negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas. This mistake must not be repeated, because that will serve Hamas' long term strategy.
He concludes by suggesting that Israel should go back to the Palestinians to present diplomatic alternatives for a just settlement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, not the cursed "Road Map for Middle East peace." Such moves could strengthen moderate forces amongst the Palestinians as a secular opposition to the Hamas government. Link
Arieli first notes that there are two main refrains that have been heard since the Hamas win: That a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority cannot be considered a partner, and the second says that because of this, Israel must continue to make unilateral disengagements. He suggests, however, that those making the first claim must ask themselves honestly: Did they consider the PA under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas and Ahmed Qurei was a credible partner? If so, why have they stubbornly refused all efforts to renew negotiations with them over the last five years? And if not, why should Israel get so excited that there is no negotiating partner? According to that approach, not much has changed, and the policy of unilateralism based on this logic should remain the preferred one.
The truth as Arieli notes is that there is a substantial difference between Fatah and Hamas. He notes that Hamas is unprepared, in contrast to the PLO, to recognize the principle of two states for two peoples, because "All of Palestine, from the river to the sea, is Islamic holy land." Hamas unlike Fatah even if they were to recognise a two state solution would not consider land swaps, dividing East Jerusalem or a demalitarized Palestinian state (as the Palestinian delegation at Geneva accepted) let alone Israeli sovereignty over "united Jerusalem, the Jordan valley and settlement blocs". Hamas in any event does not believe that the right of return should take into account "demograhic concerns" as Fatah have at times indicated.
In short, Hamas is no partner to any serious diplomatic negotiations. Arieli notes that Israel must not fantasize about turning Hamas into a possible partner for a final status agreement because of its religious outlook. In addition, it must reject any process by which the Palestinian leadership goes back to developing an illusion of power and refusal to compromise as a preferred method to establish a state and to solve the refugee issue. Using Gaza-style withdrawals, the Sharon government did all it could to avoid renewing negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas. This mistake must not be repeated, because that will serve Hamas' long term strategy.
He concludes by suggesting that Israel should go back to the Palestinians to present diplomatic alternatives for a just settlement based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, not the cursed "Road Map for Middle East peace." Such moves could strengthen moderate forces amongst the Palestinians as a secular opposition to the Hamas government. Link
posted by SJ at 11:54 PM
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