Camp David and the election of Hamas: a connection?
I am currently reading an interesting book entitled "The Camp David Summit - What went wrong?". It is a collection of papers written by American negotiators, Israelis and Palestinians which was given at a conference at Tel Aviv University in 2003.
I have read a number of books on the Camp David summit and its aftermath and I have concluded that the simplistic narrative that Ehud Barak presented to the Israeli people and the world as to what happened at Camp David and beyond is self-serving and inaccurate. Barak's narrative was essentially that Israel made a generous offer at Camp David and the Palestinians rejected it and shortly afterwards started an intifada. For Barak, the conduct of the Palestinians prove that they reject the two state solution and are committed to an armed struggle. If the Palestinians had been committed to a two state solution, then according to Barak's argument they would have surely accepted his offer - given he was offering around 90% of the territories and some degree of sovereignty over Jerusalem.
I am inclined to favour the analysis of the US official Rob Malley and others in the Israeli negotiating team like Yossi Ginnosaur, who argue that the Camp David summit and its aftermath was a complex series of events, which can not be simplified in one basic narrative. To understand the events, we need to look at what happened the year before Camp David, the events on the ground, the actual offer in detail which was made at Camp David and the further proposals put forward in December 2000 by Bill Clinton and at Taba in January 2001.
You may be asking what is the relevance of this discussion to current events. The Camp David Summit now occurred over 5 years ago. What does this have to do with Hamas winning the elections? I believe that there is a strong connection. Let me explain.
The reason I think the Barak narrative is so relevant to today is that from this narrative developed the 'no parter' thesis [ie - there is no Palestinians partner], which largely became a concensus position within the Israeli polity. This has largely guided Israeli policy for the last 5 years. Sharon winning the elections in January 2001 largely took off where Barak left off, if anything making the policy more pronounced. Barak, in the end of day continued negotiating with the Palestinians even after the intifada erupted. There were numerous discussions between Israelis and Palestinians including the Taba talks. Had Barak won no doubts those talk would have continued, even with Arafat as the head of the PA. I therefore doubt to what extent Barak himself believed in the 'no partner' thesis back in 2000.
For Sharon, the 'no partner' thesis fitted in perfectly with his own world view. Arafat, who was certainly no saint (mendacity springs to mind) was isolated both physically and diplomatically as was the PA generally. The PA security service was smashed most notably in Operation "Defensive Shield" where even Jibroul Rajoub's headquarters were attacked. In the first few years of the intifada Israel whilst going after Hamas largely went after and destroyed the PA's security infastructure in the West Bank.
The serious error came in my view when Abu Mazen became first prime-minister and then president after Arafat's death. Rather then stregthen Abu Mazen, Sharon did everything in his power to weaken him. Sharon barely met with him and when he did nothing productive came out of those meetings. I recall reading an interview given by Mohammad Dahlan, the PA's "strongman" in Gaza, describing the way Sharon would humiliate Abu Mazen at those meetings with him. Sharon provided few concessions on things like prisoner releases, check points or moving diplomatically forward with the Palestinians. The one move he made was of course was to withdraw from Gaza but this was made unilaterally with little cooperation with the PA. Working out arrangements with the Karni Gaza crossing with the PA proved disastrous and it was only because of intervention with Condi Rice involved that the matter could be resolved.
Whilst this was going on conditions on the territories were not improving. The wall/fence was continuing to be built meandering around East Jerusalem and other parts of the territories, checkpoints were not being removed, the PA was virtually going bankrupt and daily occupation was still much the same as beforehand (bar Gaza which was seen as largely a Hamas inspired success).
It in this context that Hamas was able to consolidate and win the elections. Whilst Fatah's corruption certainly played a role in Hamas's success in the election, what in my view was the key factor to Hamas's success was that Fatah could not show any achievements over the last 10 years. In Palestinian eyes, Fatah's approach which largely supported the Oslo process and negotiations had proved fruitless whilst Hamas's approach - armed resistance had achieved more then summits and meetings at Wye, Camp David, Taba or Sharm Al Sheik.
People in Israel now ask why Israeli intelligence did not predict a Hamas win. This is not the role of Israeli intelligence - anyone with any political acumen would have worked out that Hamas was going to do well - true not win but do well nevertheless. Israel must now in my view carefully reflect on its 'no partner' policy over the last six years. Israel may not be negotiating with Arafat anymore but Israel now has Hamas instead - who Israel can rightfully not negotiate with given their commitment to violence and their non-commitment to a two state solution.
In Israel's short-sightenedness it squandered its opportunities it had to stregthen Abu Mazen and Fatah, which was realistically Israel's best option out of a series of bad alternatives. The days of returning to a Camp David style summit now seem far away given Hamas is in power. The tragedy is that as proved by initiatives like the Geneva accord is that despite the difficulties in reaching a final status deal, such an arrangement is possible provided both parties are willing to make the necessary concessions. Oslo and the peace process unfortunately has proved to be reversable.
I have read a number of books on the Camp David summit and its aftermath and I have concluded that the simplistic narrative that Ehud Barak presented to the Israeli people and the world as to what happened at Camp David and beyond is self-serving and inaccurate. Barak's narrative was essentially that Israel made a generous offer at Camp David and the Palestinians rejected it and shortly afterwards started an intifada. For Barak, the conduct of the Palestinians prove that they reject the two state solution and are committed to an armed struggle. If the Palestinians had been committed to a two state solution, then according to Barak's argument they would have surely accepted his offer - given he was offering around 90% of the territories and some degree of sovereignty over Jerusalem.
I am inclined to favour the analysis of the US official Rob Malley and others in the Israeli negotiating team like Yossi Ginnosaur, who argue that the Camp David summit and its aftermath was a complex series of events, which can not be simplified in one basic narrative. To understand the events, we need to look at what happened the year before Camp David, the events on the ground, the actual offer in detail which was made at Camp David and the further proposals put forward in December 2000 by Bill Clinton and at Taba in January 2001.
You may be asking what is the relevance of this discussion to current events. The Camp David Summit now occurred over 5 years ago. What does this have to do with Hamas winning the elections? I believe that there is a strong connection. Let me explain.
The reason I think the Barak narrative is so relevant to today is that from this narrative developed the 'no parter' thesis [ie - there is no Palestinians partner], which largely became a concensus position within the Israeli polity. This has largely guided Israeli policy for the last 5 years. Sharon winning the elections in January 2001 largely took off where Barak left off, if anything making the policy more pronounced. Barak, in the end of day continued negotiating with the Palestinians even after the intifada erupted. There were numerous discussions between Israelis and Palestinians including the Taba talks. Had Barak won no doubts those talk would have continued, even with Arafat as the head of the PA. I therefore doubt to what extent Barak himself believed in the 'no partner' thesis back in 2000.
For Sharon, the 'no partner' thesis fitted in perfectly with his own world view. Arafat, who was certainly no saint (mendacity springs to mind) was isolated both physically and diplomatically as was the PA generally. The PA security service was smashed most notably in Operation "Defensive Shield" where even Jibroul Rajoub's headquarters were attacked. In the first few years of the intifada Israel whilst going after Hamas largely went after and destroyed the PA's security infastructure in the West Bank.
The serious error came in my view when Abu Mazen became first prime-minister and then president after Arafat's death. Rather then stregthen Abu Mazen, Sharon did everything in his power to weaken him. Sharon barely met with him and when he did nothing productive came out of those meetings. I recall reading an interview given by Mohammad Dahlan, the PA's "strongman" in Gaza, describing the way Sharon would humiliate Abu Mazen at those meetings with him. Sharon provided few concessions on things like prisoner releases, check points or moving diplomatically forward with the Palestinians. The one move he made was of course was to withdraw from Gaza but this was made unilaterally with little cooperation with the PA. Working out arrangements with the Karni Gaza crossing with the PA proved disastrous and it was only because of intervention with Condi Rice involved that the matter could be resolved.
Whilst this was going on conditions on the territories were not improving. The wall/fence was continuing to be built meandering around East Jerusalem and other parts of the territories, checkpoints were not being removed, the PA was virtually going bankrupt and daily occupation was still much the same as beforehand (bar Gaza which was seen as largely a Hamas inspired success).
It in this context that Hamas was able to consolidate and win the elections. Whilst Fatah's corruption certainly played a role in Hamas's success in the election, what in my view was the key factor to Hamas's success was that Fatah could not show any achievements over the last 10 years. In Palestinian eyes, Fatah's approach which largely supported the Oslo process and negotiations had proved fruitless whilst Hamas's approach - armed resistance had achieved more then summits and meetings at Wye, Camp David, Taba or Sharm Al Sheik.
People in Israel now ask why Israeli intelligence did not predict a Hamas win. This is not the role of Israeli intelligence - anyone with any political acumen would have worked out that Hamas was going to do well - true not win but do well nevertheless. Israel must now in my view carefully reflect on its 'no partner' policy over the last six years. Israel may not be negotiating with Arafat anymore but Israel now has Hamas instead - who Israel can rightfully not negotiate with given their commitment to violence and their non-commitment to a two state solution.
In Israel's short-sightenedness it squandered its opportunities it had to stregthen Abu Mazen and Fatah, which was realistically Israel's best option out of a series of bad alternatives. The days of returning to a Camp David style summit now seem far away given Hamas is in power. The tragedy is that as proved by initiatives like the Geneva accord is that despite the difficulties in reaching a final status deal, such an arrangement is possible provided both parties are willing to make the necessary concessions. Oslo and the peace process unfortunately has proved to be reversable.
posted by SJ at 4:08 AM
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